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Guns, Firms, and Zeal: Deconstructing 
Labor-Management Relations and U.S. 
Employment Policy 
Philip A. Miscimarra†
“Why did wealth and power become distributed as they now are, rather 
than in some other way? . . . The history of interactions among dispar-
ate peoples is what shaped the modern world . . . .” 
 
–Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human  
   Societies 5–6 (1997). 
  INTRODUCTION   
Jared Diamond has received wide acclaim for his Pulitzer 
Prize-winning book—Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of 
Human Societies1—which charts the path of human history. 
Professor Diamond asks why Europeans explored and dominat-
ed populations in North America and Africa, rather than the 
other way around, and he concludes that Europeans prevailed 
because of guns, germs, and steel, referring to 
(1) their advanced weapons; (2) devastating epidemics among 
people who had no immunity to infectious diseases; and 
(3) other advantages associated with tools and implements 
made of steel.2
 
†  Member, National Labor Relations Board; formerly Senior Fellow, 
Center for Human Resources, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylva-
nia; and Partner, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP. Copyright © 2014 by Philip 
A. Miscimarra. 
 It is only slightly less ambitious to attempt a de-
 1. JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN 
SOCIETIES (1997). 
 2. Professor Diamond summarizes the “proximate factors that resulted 
in Europeans’ colonizing the New World instead of Native Americans’ colo-
nizing Europe” as follows:  
Immediate reasons for Pizarro’s success [in capturing Atahuallpa] in-
cluded military technology based on guns, steel weapons, and horses; 
infectious diseases endemic in Eurasia; European maritime technolo-
gy; the centralized political organization of European states; and writ-
ing. The title of this book will serve as shorthand for those proximate 
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construction of labor-management relations in the United 
States.  
There is no shortage of insightful commentary regarding 
the ebb and flow of U.S. labor and employment policy, unions, 
and labor-management relations,3
With apologies to Professor Diamond, this Essay suggests 
three concepts—guns, firms, and zeal—that shed light on these 
questions. “Guns” refers to the bargaining model central to the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), where each side’s lever-
age largely stems from economic damage it may inflict on the 
other party. “Firms” refers to companies and unions and their 
emergence as part of a nationwide economy that existed when 
the NLRA became law in 1935. “Zeal” refers to the discourse 
 and this Essay does not dis-
pute any of the diverse views expressed by advocates on all 
sides. Much of the available analysis, however, leaves unan-
swered two fundamental questions. First, why have labor-
management issues continued to spawn such immense acrimo-
ny, seemingly without regard to the state of affairs regarding 
labor-management relations and changing levels of union rep-
resentation? Second, does answering the first question provide 
any insights about potential alternate paths for those who ad-
vocate changes in U.S. labor and employment law? 
 
factors, which also enabled modern Europeans to conquer peoples of 
other continents. 
DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 80–81. 
 3. See, e.g., Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Represen-
tation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495 (1993); Dale 
Belman & Paula B. Voos, Union Wages and Union Decline: Evidence from the 
Construction Industry, 60 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 67 (2006); Richard A. Ep-
stein, Labor Unions: Saviors or Scourges?, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (2013); Cyn-
thia L. Estlund, Are Unions Doomed to Being a “Niche Movement” in a Com-
petitive Economy?, 155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNumbra 165 (2006); Cynthia L. 
Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527 
(2002); Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Prod-
uct Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (1993); Henry S. Farber, Nonunion Wage 
Rates and the Threat of Unionization, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 335 (2005); 
John Godard, The Exceptional Decline of the American Labor Movement, 63 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 82 (2009); William B. Gould IV, A Century and Half 
Century of Advance and Retreat: The Ebbs and Flows of Workplace Democracy, 
86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 431 (2012); Raymond L. Hogler, The Historical Miscon-
ception of Right to Work Laws in the United States: Senator Robert Wagner, 
Legal Policy, and the Decline of American Unions, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J. 101 (2005); David Millon, Keeping Hope Alive, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
369 (2011); Katherine S. Newman, The Great Recession and the Pressure on 
Workplace Rights, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 529 (2013); Benjamin I. Sachs, Ena-
bling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union Organiz-
ing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655 (2010); Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Cor-
poratist Institution in a Competitive World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581 (2007).   
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regarding labor-management policy issues that has become so 
contentious in recent years.  
As to the first question posed above—why labor-
management issues currently involve so much “zeal”—I suggest 
that the answer is heavily influenced by “guns” and “firms,” 
combined with a global economy that was barely imaginable in 
1935 when the NLRA was adopted.4 The potential infliction of 
economic injury affects companies, unions, and employees very 
differently now, in an economy that defies national boundaries, 
because there is a much greater risk, both real and perceived, 
that economic conflict may result in financial ruin, and unions 
understandably regard employer opposition (regardless of the 
reasons) as challenging their institutional existence. This hy-
pothesis—described in Part I below—differs from the time-
worn suggestion that labor-management relations are inherent-
ly adversarial.5 Rather, the work of labor economists John R. 
Commons and Selig Perlman, who are perhaps the two most 
authoritative historians of the American labor movement, indi-
cates that a similar situation arose when the transition to na-
tional markets resulted in unprecedented business competition, 
which, in turn, caused extensive labor-management instabil-
ity.6
As to the second question posed above, examining these 
concepts—guns, firms, and zeal—suggests that some alterna-
tive paths may provide opportunities for a different, more con-
structive evaluation of labor and employment policy reforms. 
  
 
 4. This Essay focuses on technological and other changes responsible for 
global competition which, in turn, has tended to destabilize labor-management 
relations. See infra notes 13–27 and accompanying text. Such changes have 
also increased the extent of competition within the United States in equally 
profound ways. Therefore, I believe the observations in the text have similar 
relevance to the hospitality and service industries, for example, and other U.S. 
employers, employees, and unions even if they are not directly involved in in-
ternational commerce. 
 5. There have been many examples of significant labor-management co-
operation and constructive labor relations. See, e.g., infra notes 8–9 and ac-
companying text. 
 6. John R. Commons and Selig Perlman carefully documented the histo-
ry of the American labor movement, commencing with a 1786 strike among 
Philadelphia wage-earners who demanded a minimum wage of six dollars per 
week. See 1 JOHN R. COMMONS, HISTORY OF LABOUR IN THE UNITED STATES 
25–30 (1918); SELIG PERLMAN, A HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNITED 
STATES 36–41 (1922); see also PHILIP S. FONER, THE HISTORY OF THE LABOR 
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE FOUNDING 
OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 338–40 (1947). 
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These potential alternative paths are described in Part II be-
low. 
The ensuing discussion is subject to several important dis-
claimers. First, as noted previously, these views are not intend-
ed to supplant or detract from the many diverse opinions that 
scholars and practitioners in this area have expressed.7 No sin-
gle theory or explanation accounts for the current state of U.S. 
labor-management relations. Labor-management relations in-
volve a wide variety of relevant issues, so support usually ex-
ists somewhere, to some degree, even for the most extreme 
views on all sides of every argument. Thus, former Chairman 
John Fanning served on the NLRB under Democrats and Re-
publicans for nearly twenty-five years, and he stated, “[a]s 
someone who . . . participated in some 25,000 decisions of the 
Board, I can assure you that the one factor every [NLRB] case 
has in common . . . is the presence of at least two people who 
see things completely different.”8
Second, this Essay does not advocate changes in current 
law. As a member of the NLRB, I am committed to the even-
handed enforcement of the current NLRA, which, in its present 
form, provides important protection to employees, unions, and 
employers. There is no shortage of scholars, commentators, and 
practitioners who seek to expand, limit, or otherwise modify the 
protection afforded by the NLRA and other statutes. Congress 
is responsible for establishing the appropriate balance of inter-
ests between employers, unions, employees, and the public, and 
for determining whether there should be changes in current 
law. I completely yield to others the question of whether or how 
anyone should argue for such changes. 
 
Third, the NLRA’s reliance on economic injury—which cre-
ates an incentive for parties to inflict or threaten one another 
with economic harm—does not mean unions and companies are 
irrevocably committed to ruinous conflict and adversarial labor-
management relations. Many companies, unions, and employ-
ees have forged constructive relationships and have jointly re-
 
 7. See, e.g., supra note 3 (citing articles expressing a number of diverse 
opinions relating to the American labor movement).  
 8. John H. Fanning, The National Labor Relations Act: Its Past and Its 
Future, in FIRST ANNUAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW INSTITUTE 59, 62 
(William F. Dolson ed., 1985), quoted in Matthew M. Bodah, Congress and the 
National Labor Relations Board: A Review of the Recent Past, 22 J. LAB. RES. 
699, 713 (2001). 
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solved many difficult workplace problems.9 Similarly, this Es-
say’s discussion of economic conflict under the NLRA is not 
meant to disparage the Act. Possible resort to economic weap-
ons is the engine Congress devised for inducing parties to agree 
upon alternatives to industrial strife.10
Finally, it is important to recognize that many parties will 
have difficulty finding common ground regarding these mat-
ters. Representatives of unions and management frequently 
have years of experience giving rise to strong feelings about the 
other side’s actions, practices, and motives.
 The types of economic 
injuries permitted under the Act—and whether there might be 
some adjustment in the available weapons as part of broader 
labor reform efforts—are worthy of discussion, particularly 




 9. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 
162–80 (1984); see also James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman, Introduction to 
WHAT DO UNIONS DO? A TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE 1, 2 (James T. Bennett 
& Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 2007); THOMAS A. KOCHAN & PAUL OSTERMAN, THE 
MUTUAL GAINS ENTERPRISE: FORGING A WINNING PARTNERSHIP AMONG LA-
BOR, MANAGEMENT, AND GOVERNMENT 45 (1994); IRVING H. SIEGEL & EDGAR 
WEINBERG, LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
76–97 (1982); SUMNER H. SLICHTER, JAMES J. HEALY & E. ROBERT 
LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 
(1960); George H. Cohen, Dir., Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv., Address at 
the White House Labor and Management Partnership Summit (Dec. 6, 2013), 
http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=39&itemID=24405. 
 Some people may 
believe that their interests are well served by continuing the 
status quo, and others may believe that constructive discourse 
constitutes the improper surrender of fundamental ideological 
views. At a minimum, such differences demonstrate that the 
 10. See infra Part I.B; infra notes 27–37 and accompanying text.  
 11. Of course, forceful advocacy regarding employment matters in the 
workplace among two or more employees is affirmatively protected under the 
NLRA. See, e.g., Starbucks Coffee Co., 355 N.L.R.B. 636, 636 (2010); Datwyler 
Rubber & Plastics, 350 N.L.R.B. 669, 670–71 (2007); CKS Tool & Eng’g, 332 
N.L.R.B. 1578, 1580–81, 1586 (2000). Regarding the NLRB, I have written 
that one can even “reasonably expect to be criticized for engaging in the effort 
to have ‘dispassionate’ discourse since the work of the Board affects jobs, fami-
lies, communities, the economy, employment stability, and a wide array of 
freedoms (e.g., freedom of speech, association, competition, individual versus 
collective decision-making, and the exercise versus non-exercise of NLRA 
rights).” Philip A. Miscimarra, Address at the ABA Committee on Practice and 
Procedure under the National Labor Relations Act, Angels, Demons and the 
NLRB—Perspectives on Congressional Oversight 2 (Mar. 3, 2012), https://www 
.morganlewis.com/pubs/Miscimarra_AngelsDemonsNLRB_03march12.pdf. 
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NLRA has continuing relevance, as reflected in the contentious 
discussion of so many labor-management policy issues.12
I.  GUNS, FIRMS, AND ZEAL: THE ELEMENTS OF 
STRUCTURAL DISCORD   
  
From its inception, the NLRA has produced a steady 
stream of criticism from all sides, much of it directed at the 
NLRB.13
 
 12. Not much has changed since Professor Summers made the following 
observation about the NLRB more than fifty years ago:  
 This gives rise to the question raised earlier: why is 
The labor lawyer’s world is not a secure one, for [the lawyer] walks on 
a thin crust of precedents. The body of Board decisions in many areas 
often gives an appearance of firmness only to have tremors beneath 
the surface open unexpected fissures or raise new ranges of decisions. 
In our primitiveness we may see these faults and upheavals in the 
crust of precedents as acts of God or Satan, crediting angels or devils 
incarnate in the bodies of Board members. With the appointment of 
new members the warning rumblings become more noticeable, and we 
spur our efforts to seek out the spirits and identify them as good or 
evil. 
Clyde W. Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 93, 93 (1955). 
 13. Democrats and Republicans alike, at different times, have challenged 
the work of the Board, as evidenced by the following eight examples.  
(1) A 1947 Senate report regarding the Taft-Hartley amendments to the 
NLRA stated:  
The need for such legislation is urgent. . . . [T]he administration of 
the National Labor Relations Act itself has tended to destroy the 
equality of bargaining power necessary to maintain industrial 
peace. . . . Moreover, as a result of certain administrative practices . . . 
the Board has acquired a reputation for partisanship, which the 
committee bill seeks to overcome, by insisting upon certain procedural 
reforms. 
S. Rep. No. 80-105 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 407, 408 (1948).  
(2) A 1984 House report quoted a statement by James Kane—then Presi-
dent of United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America—that the 
Board was “dominated by anti-labor zealots.” SUBCOMM. ON LABOR-MGMT. 
RELATIONS OF THE COMM. ON EDUC., & LABOR, 98TH CONG., THE FAILURE OF 
LABOR LAW—A BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN WORKERS 14 (Comm. Print 1984) (ci-
tations omitted). The report also indicated there was a “collapse of confidence 
in the objectivity of the current Board,” because the Board “altered the sub-
stance of the law in a manner contrary to the objectives of the Act.” Id. at 15–
16.  
(3) In 1997, House Republicans conducted a hearing in which then Gen-
eral Counsel Fred Feinstein was called “the most biased General Counsel in 
history.” Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1998, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
the Dep’ts of Labor, Health & Human Servs., Educ. & Related Agencies of the 
H. Comm. on Appropriations, Part 6, 105th Cong. 706 (1997) (statement of 
Rep. Henry Bonilla). Feinstein was questioned regarding “the frequency of 
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there so much antipathy regarding labor-management issues, 
where the competing views have been unaffected by changing 
metrics regarding union density and levels of union representa-
tion?  
 
[his] contact with union attorneys,” and accused of extravagance relating to 
“private showers for Board Members, chauffeur-driven limousines, private li-
braries for Board members, and a kitchen and cooks at Board headquarters.” 
Matthew M. Bodah, Congress and the National Labor Relations Board: A Re-
view of the Recent Past, 22 J. LAB. RES. 699, 706 (2001).  
(4) In 2007, a joint hearing was conducted by the House and Senate labor 
committees regarding the NLRB in which Democratic House Committee on 
Education and Labor Chairman George Miller stated that “brick by brick, the 
NLRB has worked to dismantle the foundation of workers’ rights in this coun-
try.” The National Labor Relations Board: Recent Decisions and their Impact 
on Workers’ Rights, Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health, Emp’t, La-
bor & Pensions of the H. Comm. on Education & Labor, and Subcomm. on 
Emp’t & Workplace Safety of the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pen-
sions, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (prepared statement of George Miller, Chairman, 
H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor).  
(5) To the same effect, Democratic Senate Labor Committee Chairman 
Edward Kennedy stated:  
This board has undermined collective bargaining at every turn, put-
ting the power of the law on the side of lawbreakers, not victims, on 
the side of a minority of workers who want to get rid of a union, not 
the majority who want one and on the side of employers who refuse to 
hire union supporters, not the hard-working union members who 
want to exercise their democratic rights. 
Id. at 15 (statement of Edward Kennedy, Chairman, S. Comm. on Health, 
Educ., Labor, & Pensions).  
(6) In 2011, the Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor and Pen-
sions of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce held a hearing, 
where Republican Subcommittee Chairman Phil Roe stated, “the Board has 
abandoned its traditional sense of fairness and neutrality and instead em-
braced a far more activist approach,” and that “[n]umerous actions by the 
Board suggest it is eager to tilt the playing field in favor of powerful special 
interests against the interests of rank and file workers.” Emerging Trends at 
the National Labor Relations Board, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health, 
Emp’t, Labor & Pensions of the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 112th 
Cong. 2 (2011).  
(7) In a 2013 hearing, Democrat John F. Tierney stated that Republicans 
were pursuing a “special interest driven anti-worker agenda” to “lower wages, 
impede workers’ rights to associate freely, and threaten the economic security 
of the middle class.” Hearing on H.R. 2346 “Secret Ballot Protection Act,” and 
H.R. 2347 “Representation Fairness Restoration Act” Before the Subcomm. on 
Health, Emp’t, Labor & Pensions of the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 
113th Cong. (2013), available at http://edworkforce.house.gov/news/document 
single.aspx?DocumentID=340556 (statement of Rep. John F. Tierney).  
(8) At the same hearing, Republican Phil Roe stated that the NLRB was 
imposing a “radically different” standard regarding bargaining units where 
“labor bosses will gerrymander workplaces, [and] employers will be buried in 
union red tape.” Id. (statement of Phil Roe, Chairman, Subcomm. on Health, 
Emp’t, Labor & Pensions). 
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This Essay suggests that one answer to this question in-
volves structural discord that results from the combination of 
three things: (1) the manner in which employers and unions 
functioned in the national economy that existed when the 
NLRA was adopted (i.e., “firms”); (2) the NLRA bargaining 
model, which focuses in large part on the threatened or actual 
infliction of economic injury (i.e., “guns”); and (3) the impact of 
our increasingly global economy on these aspects of U.S. labor 
and employment policy, which explains to a significant degree 
the contentious nature of labor policy debates in recent years 
(i.e., “zeal”). These three elements are briefly described below, 
followed by an examination in Part II of the potential implica-
tions for any future discussions about labor and employment 
policy reform. 
A. FIRMS—IMPACT OF A CHANGING ECONOMY 
Labor and legal scholars have written extensively about 
the uneven course of union representation and collective bar-
gaining in the United States, dating back to this country’s ori-
gins. This work reveals that the history of U.S. unions has been 
inextricably tied to the economy, and, in particular, to the ex-
tent of relevant markets. In his authoritative history of the 
U.S. labor movement, John R. Commons emphasized that the 
labor movement accompanied the “extension of markets” to our 
national boundaries.14 Thus, by the 1880s, according to Com-
mons, “the extension of markets had practically reached its lim-
it . . . and the nation had become a single market.”15
Further economic development produced the “labour 
movement of the twentieth century”
  
16 that became the focus of 
New Deal legislation in the 1930s. Commenting on this “mod-
ern movement,”17 Commons observed that “on the one side, the 
huge corporation, [and] on the other side, the trade union . . . 
each reached a stage of centralisation under a single head that 
brooks no competitor—far beyond the loose and tolerant syndi-
cates of capital or unions of labour in foreign lands.”18
Labor economist Selig Perlman traced the development of 
unions in the shoe industry, which he said “epitomized the gen-
  
 
 14. COMMONS, supra note 6, at 6.  
 15. Id. at 8. 
 16. Id. at 21. 
 17. Id. at 8. 
 18. Id. (emphasis added).  
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eral economic evolution of the country.”19 At first, the industry 
was “purely local,”20 but improved transportation prompted 
business owners to expand into other markets.21 Initially, this 
market expansion significantly increased “cut-throat” competi-
tion and depressed prices, with substantial downward pressure 
on wage rates.22 According to Perlman, “The capitalist . . . 
placed himself across the outlets to the market and dominated 
by using all the available competitive menaces to both contrac-
tor and wage earner. Hence the bitter class struggle.”23 By the 
1890s, however, the business climate became more advanta-
geous to manufacturers because they acquired greater competi-
tive leverage based on the introduction of national store chains 
and better intellectual property protection.24 Consequently, la-
bor-management relations improved and the “industrial class 
struggle [began] to abate in intensity.”25
The employer, now comparatively free of anxiety that he may be 
forced to operate at a loss, is able to diminish pressure on wages. But 
more than this: the greater certainty about the future, now that he is 
a free agent, enables him to enter into time agreements with a trade 
union. At first he is generally disinclined to forego any share of his 
newly acquired freedom by tying himself up with a union. But if the 
union is strong and can offer battle, then he accepts the situation and 
“recognizes” it. Thus the class struggle instead of becoming sharper 
and sharper with the advance of capitalism and leading, as Marx pre-
dicted, to a social revolution, in reality, grows less and less revolu-
tionary and leads to a compromise or succession of compromises—
namely, collective trade agreements.
 Perlman explained: 
26
 
 19. PERLMAN, supra note 
 
6, at 269. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. at 271, 273–74. 
 23. Id. at 271–72 (emphasis added). To the same effect, when describing 
the “single market” that emerged from economic expansion by the 1880s, 
Commons stated it was “menaced at every point of its vast expanse by every 
competitor, no matter where situated.” COMMONS, supra note 6, at 8. 
 24. PERLMAN, supra note 6, at 274. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 274–75. In addition to the impact of geographic expansion, la-
bor-management relations have also been greatly affected by cyclical fluctua-
tions in the economy. Perlman wrote: “The character of the labor struggle has 
been influenced by cyclical changes in industry as much as by the permanent 
changes in the organization of industry and market.” Id. Perlman elaborated 
as follows: 
[W]hat determined the plane of thought and action at any one time 
was the state of business measured by movements of wholesale and re-
tail prices and employment and unemployment. When prices rose and 
margins of employers’ profits were on the increase, the demand for 
labor increased and accordingly also labor’s strength as a bargainer; 
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Thus, when the NLRA was enacted in 1935, (1) American 
trade unions and companies both functioned in a national econ-
omy, and (2) the United States was regarded as distinct and 
independent from other countries. This was described by Com-
mons, writing in 1918:  
The vast area of the United States, coupled with free trade within 
that area and a spreading network of transportation, has developed 
an unparalleled extension of the competitive area of markets, and 
thereby has strikingly distinguished American movements from those 
of other countries. It is almost as though the countries of Europe, from 
Ireland to Turkey, from Norway to Italy, had been joined in a single 
empire like China, but, unlike China, had passed through a century of 
industrial revolution. Here, indeed, we have had at first thirteen, and 
now forty-eight sovereign states within a single empire . . . .27
B. GUNS—THE NLRA’S ECONOMIC INJURY MODEL  
 
The NLRA (or “Wagner Act”)28 resulted from years of work 
by Congress in the midst of the Great Depression.29
 
at the same time, labor was compelled to organize to meet a rising 
cost of living. At such times trade unionism monopolized the arena, 
won strikes, increased membership, and forced “cure-alls” and politics 
into the background. When, however, prices fell and margins of profit 
contracted, labor’s bargaining strength waned, strikes were lost, trade 
unions faced the danger of extinction, and “cure-alls” and politics re-
ceived their day in court. Labor would turn to government and politics 
only as a last resort, when it had lost confidence in its ability to hold 
its own in industry. This phenomenon, noticeable also in other coun-
tries, came out with particular clearness in America. 
 Consistent 
with then-existing union and corporate growth, the Act’s legis-
Id. at 276–77 (emphasis added). 
 27. COMMONS, supra note 6, at 5–6 (emphasis added). 
 28. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)). 
 29. The Wagner Act legislation dates back to March 1, 1934, when Sena-
tor Robert F. Wagner introduced S. 2926 during the 73d Congress. S. 2926, 
73d Cong. (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NA-
TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 1 (1949) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY]. Companion legislation—H.R. 8423—was introduced in the House 
by Representative William Connery, Chairman of the House Committee on 
Labor. H.R. 8423, 73d Cong. (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, su-
pra, at 1128 (introduced March 1, 1934). Prior to the Wagner Act’s adoption, 
important labor-management issues were addressed in the Norris-La Guardia 
Act, Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), and the National Industrial Recov-
ery Act (NIRA), Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2012)). The Supreme Court declared the NIRA uncon-
stitutional in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 
(1935). 
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lative history reveals that Congress focused on “the protection 
of Nation-wide commerce.”30
Paradoxically, the NLRA safeguards the right of employ-
ees, unions, and companies to utilize strikes, lockouts, and a 
variety of other economic weapons in order to avoid obstruc-
tions to commerce.
  
31 As the Supreme Court stated in NLRB v. 
Insurance Agents’ International Union,32 parties in collective 
bargaining “proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonis-
tic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest. . . . The presence of 
economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occa-
sion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system that the 
Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized.”33
 
 30. As stated in the Senate report on S. 1958 (which, with some refine-
ment, became the Wagner Act):  
 
An analysis of the effect of a decline in mass purchasing power upon 
all commercial transactions forces the conclusion that the protection 
of Nation-wide commerce depends as much upon a floor for wages as 
upon a ceiling for prices. And in stabilizing wages, no factor plays a 
more important role than collective bargaining. 
S. Rep. No. 74-573, at 18–19 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, su-
pra note 29, at 2318.  
 31. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (establishing policy “to eliminate the 
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to 
mitigate and eliminate those obstructions”); see also First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. 
NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674 (1981) (“A fundamental aim of the National Labor 
Relations Act is the establishment and maintenance of industrial peace to pre-
serve the flow of interstate commerce.” (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1937))); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 
379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964) (“One of the primary purposes of the Act is to pro-
mote the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes by subjecting labor-
management controversies to the mediatory influence of negotiation.”); Local 
24, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295 (1959) (“The goal of 
federal labor policy, as expressed in the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, is the 
promotion of collective bargaining . . . and thereby to minimize industrial 
strife.”). 
 32. 361 U.S. 477 (1960). 
 33. Id. at 487–89. The NLRA’s legislative history includes references to 
many labor disputes that caused substantial economic dislocation in the early 
twentieth century. As reflected in one Senate report: 
The first objective of the bill is to promote industrial peace. The chal-
lenge of economic unrest is not new. During the period from 1915 
through 1921 there were on the average 3,043 strikes per year, in-
volving the vacating of 1,745,000 jobs and the loss of 50,242,000 work-
ing days every 12 months. From 1922 through 1926 the annual aver-
age totaled 1,050 strikes, 775,000 strikers, and 17,050,000 working-
days lost. From 1927 through 1931 the yearly average for disputes 
was 763, for employees leaving their work 275,000, and for days lost 
5,665,000. In 1933 over 812,137 workers were drawn into strikes, and 
in 1934 the number rose to 1,277,344. In this 2-year period over 
32,000,000 working-days were lost because of labor controversies. 
While exactitude is impossible, reliable authority has it that over a 
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It has been tricky to maintain the right balance in this cal-
culus because it risks producing a cure that could kill the pa-
tient. The right of unions and employers to engage in strikes, 
lockouts, and related tactics—if used too frequently or on too 
large a scale—could destroy the very unions and companies 
whose activities are being protected. Debilitating conflict, if re-
alized, could impede or eliminate the hope of fostering economic 
security for employees, family members, customers, vendors, 
suppliers, and local and state governments, all of whom are de-
pendent on successful businesses. Yet, these businesses can on-
ly accomplish their objectives through the people they employ.  
In part to refine the statute’s balancing of labor-
management interests, important NLRA amendments were 
adopted in 1947 as part of the Taft-Hartley Act, which, among 
other things, added union unfair labor practices to the Act.34 In 
1959, the Landrum-Griffin Act amended the NLRA in other re-
spects, including adjustments to the Act’s “secondary boycott” 
provisions (which afford protection to “neutral” parties not di-
rectly involved in the “primary” dispute giving rise to a labor-
management conflict).35 In 1974, Congress adopted amend-
ments to address particularized concerns regarding the role of 
the NLRA in healthcare settings.36
Under the NLRA and its various amendments, potential 
economic harm has been the engine of collective bargaining for 
nearly eighty years.
 
37 Over this period, our bargaining model 
has produced many instances of successful agreements and col-
laboration between employers, unions, and employees on an ar-
ray of complex issues.38
 
long range of time the losses due to strikes in this country has 
amounted to at least $1,000,000,000 per year. And no one can count 
the cost in bitterness of feeling, in inefficiency, and in permanent in-
dustrial dislocation. 
 And since the 1930s, all kinds of enter-
prises in the United States have flourished, as have many 
S. Rep. No. 74-573, at 1–2 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 29, at 2300–01.  
 34. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 
61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
 35. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, 
Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 29 U.S.C.). 
 36. Health Care Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act (the 
“Health Care Amendments”), Pub. L. No 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
 37. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.  
 38. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 9 (listing authorities who cite to ex-
amples of such agreements). 
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millions of represented and unrepresented employees, resulting 
in goods and services that benefit people throughout the world.  
Yet, it is also undeniable that labor-management conflict 
under the NLRA has, at times, imposed real costs on employ-
ers, unions, employees, and others. The Taft-Hartley amend-
ments resulted in large part from labor-management strife that 
occurred in the aftermath of World War II (during which there 
had been stringent wage-price controls).39 Some commentators 
have also written that collectively bargained gains—though 
conferring important benefits—have involved tradeoffs causing 
or contributing to layoffs, shutdowns, or the decline of certain 
employers and industries.40
C. ZEAL—IMPACT OF ECONOMIC INJURY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY  
  
The primary question posed at the outset of this Essay is 
why labor-management issues have continued to spawn such 
immense acrimony, seemingly without regard to the current 
state of affairs of labor-management relations, levels of union 
representation, and similar matters. This question—which fo-
cuses on what I call “zeal”—can be explained in part by consid-
ering together the two other concepts described previously: 
firms (how employers and unions functioned in the 1930s when 
the Wagner Act was adopted), and guns (the role played by 
economic injury in the NLRA’s bargaining model). When evalu-
ating the interaction of these concepts (firms and guns), one 
should keep in mind the work of labor economists such as 
Commons and Seligman, who directly attributed the emergence 
of stable unions and companies—and stable labor-management 
relations—to the existence of a national economy. As noted 
previously, they concluded that stable labor-management rela-
tions resulted when the national economy “brook[ed] no com-
 
 39. Jack Barbash, Unions and Rights in the Space Age, in THE U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF LABOR BICENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER 248 
(Richard B. Morris ed., 1976), available at http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/ 
history/chapter6.htm. 
 40. Because management and union representatives agree to collectively 
bargained contract terms, this undermines arguments that one side bears sole 
responsibility for the consequences of labor negotiations. Long-term trends, 
however, are clearly influenced by the legal framework that governs collective 
bargaining, including the economic weapons available to the parties, among 
other factors. For two interesting accounts regarding the impact of collective 
bargaining on very different industries, see JOHN HELYAR, THE LORDS OF THE 
REALM: THE REAL HISTORY OF BASEBALL (1994); JOHN HOERR, AND THE WOLF 
FINALLY CAME: THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN STEEL INDUSTRY (1988). 
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petitor” for companies and unions,41 the United States consti-
tuted a “single empire” independent from other countries,42 and 
this meant parties were “comparatively free of [economic] anxi-
ety” because they had relative “certainty about the future.”43
The American economy has undergone monumental 
changes since the NLRA’s adoption in 1935, and the past sev-
eral decades have been characterized by unparalleled global 
economic integration. Thus, as former Federal Reserve Chair-
man Ben Bernanke stated, “the greater part of the earth’s pop-





 41. COMMONS, supra note 
 
6, at 8.  
 42. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
 43. PERLMAN, supra note 6, at 274–75.  
 44. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, 
Global Economic Integration: What’s New and What’s Not?, Speech at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Thirtieth Annual Economic Symposi-
um (Aug. 25, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
speech/Bernanke20060825a.htm. Chairman Bernanke described post-World 
War II economic integration as resulting from “several factors, both technolog-
ical and political,” as follows:  
Technological advances further reduced the costs of transportation 
and communication, as the air freight fleet was converted from pro-
peller to jet and intermodal shipping techniques (including container-
ization) became common. Telephone communication expanded, and 
digital electronic computing came into use. Taken together, these ad-
vances allowed an ever-broadening set of products to be traded inter-
nationally. In the policy sphere, tariff barriers—which had been dra-
matically increased during the Great Depression—were lowered, with 
many of these reductions negotiated within the multilateral frame-
work provided by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Glob-
alization was, to some extent, also supported by geopolitical consider-
ations, as economic integration among the Western market economies 
became viewed as part of the strategy for waging the Cold War. 
. . . .  
  By almost any economically relevant metric, distances have 
shrunk considerably in recent decades. As a consequence, economical-
ly speaking, Wausau and Wuhan are today closer and more interde-
pendent than ever before. 
Id. Thomas Friedman has similarly described our economic interdependence, 
which has increased dramatically in recent years:  
‘Globalization’ is the word we came up with to describe the changing 
relationships between governments and big businesses. . . . But what 
is going on today is a much broader, much more profound phenome-
non. . . . It is about things that impact some of the deepest, most in-
grained aspects of society right down to the nature of the social con-
tract. . . . What happens if the political entity in which you are located 
no longer corresponds to a job that takes place in cyberspace, or no 
longer really encompasses workers collaborating with other workers 
in different corners of the globe, or no longer really captures products 
produced in multiple places simultaneously? Who regulates the work? 
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In contrast to the early-twentieth-century assessment of 
relevant markets by labor economists Commons and Perlman, 
the modern-day global economy means that virtually nobody is 
“comparatively free” of anxiety over competition, nor can one 
have nearly as much “certainty about the future.”45 In this re-
spect, employers operate in a climate similar to how Selig 
Perlman described the 1880s, when the expanded markets 
meant employers faced unprecedented competition, which, in 
turn, produced intense labor competition and wage pressure, 
resulting in substantial labor-management instability.46 This 
makes it easier to understand why so many employers—and 
possibly employees—might presently have concerns about a 
process centered around the threat or infliction of economic in-
jury on the business where people are employed. Conversely, 
for organized labor, the most objectionable element in this cal-
culus is, understandably, the employer’s resistance to union 
representation.47
Certainly, there are other explanations for the rancorous 
debate that has so often accompanied discourse over labor-
management issues. One oft-cited factor relates to increased 
political partisanship, especially when Congress considers la-
bor-management issues.
 These factors almost invariably appear to 
place employers and unions in opposition to one another, while 
employees are left to determine what best advances their inter-
ests. In the resulting struggle, one can anticipate why compa-
nies and unions might denounce one another’s motives and tac-
tics without dispassionately examining the impact of real or 
threatened economic injury in a global economy. 
48
[P]olitical polarization obviously affects Congress and the Board, but 
there may be disagreements here regarding what constitutes the 
“cause” and what constitutes the “effect.” . . . It is not self-evident 
[whether] increased political polarization within Congress causes in-
creased controversy regarding Board oversight; or whether the 
“someone wins/someone loses” aspect of NLRB decision-making is the 
reason congressional oversight activities involve greater political po-
larization. It is perhaps most likely that a complex variety of factors 
 As I have previously written: 
 
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 45 (2005) (quoting David Rothkopf, a former senior Depart-
ment of Commerce official in the Clinton Administration).  
 45. PERLMAN, supra note 6, at 274–75 (emphasis added). 
 46. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
 47. See Estreicher, supra note 3, at 2–6; cf. Samuel Estreicher, Trade Un-
ionism Under Globalization, The Demise of Volunteerism?, 54 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 415 (2009).  
 48. See supra note 13. 
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(e.g., global competition, an unfavorable economy, declines in union 
density, and political polarization in the country) all contribute to an 
environment that makes Board actions and congressional oversight 
activities contentious and controversial.49
 
 
II.  POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT POLICY   
Among advocates of labor and employment law reform, 
most recent efforts have focused on adjusting the law to in-
crease the effectiveness of tools available to unions in organiz-
ing and collective bargaining, combined with limiting the abil-
ity of employers to oppose union representation.50 Conversely, 
at other times, changes in the law have been criticized as being 
too favorable to employers.51 In a global economy, where so 
many parties face exceptionally difficult challenges, such re-
form efforts arguably leave the players in the same arena while 
increasing the intensity of the weapons available to each side.52 
Thus, when such reforms are considered, it is predictable that 
many parties denounce one another without more critically 
evaluating the underlying reason there appears to be a zero-
sum game—i.e., whatever one side wins, the other side loses.53
What alternative paths might provide opportunities for 
discussing changes to U.S. labor and employment policy on a 
more constructive basis? As noted previously, I do not advocate 
 
Yet, from the perspective of U.S. policy, if one leaves un-
changed the fact of global competition, then increasing labor-
management conflict can result in negative consequences for 
all of the U.S. participants. 
 
 49. Miscimarra, supra note 11, at 14. As indicated in note 13, supra, there 
is no shortage of examples where Democrats and Republicans in Congress 
have criticized the NLRB. 
 50. The most prominent recent example of such a proposed reform in-
volved efforts to enact the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), introduced in 
the 111th Congress, which would have required union recognition based on 
majority support evidenced by signed authorization cards, the formulation of 
initial contracts based on arbitration if negotiated agreements did not occur 
within prescribed time periods, and the modification of certain NLRA reme-
dies. See S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 51. See, e.g., supra note 13 (describing negative comments in 1984 and 
2007, for example, criticizing NLRB decisions as undermining the interests of 
unions, workers and collective bargaining).  
 52. See Estreicher, supra note 3, at 30–33 (discussing a Canadian model 
of labor law reform). 
 53. Id. at 32–33 (critiquing attempts to strengthen union membership 
without changing existing rules to strengthen union competitiveness). 
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any particular reforms, but—by way of illustration—there are 
potential alternatives to the zero-sum-game approaches de-
scribed above.  
A. EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW REFORMS  
One possibility is to increase the size of the arena. This 
could involve a broader consideration of U.S. labor and em-
ployment policy reforms that extend beyond labor-management 
issues. For example, the NLRA was created to produce a single, 
national regulatory scheme that broadly preempted state and 
local law.54
 
 54. The Supreme Court explained the doctrine of federal preemption re-
garding labor law issues as follows: 
 Especially when evaluating U.S. labor and employ-
ment policy in the context of global economic challenges, one 
Congress [in the NLRA] did not merely lay down a substantive rule of 
law to be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally 
to the parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and appli-
cation of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal, and 
prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and no-
tice, and hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending a final 
administrative order. Congress evidently considered that centralized 
administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to ob-
tain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these 
diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local proce-
dures and attitudes toward labor controversies. Indeed, Pennsylvania 
passed a statute the same year as its labor relations Act reciting 
abuses of the injunction in labor litigations attributable more to pro-
cedure and usage than to substantive rules. 
Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953). In San Diego Building 
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), the Supreme Court likewise 
indicated that the NLRA incorporated a “single, uniform, national rule” that 
displaced the “variegated laws of the several States,” even though the doctrine 
of federal preemption was described as involving “difficult problems of federal-
state relations.” Id. at 239, 241. The Court elaborated: “When the exercise of 
state power over a particular area of activity threatened interference with the 
clearly indicated policy of industrial relations, it has been judicially necessary 
to preclude the States from acting.” Id. at 243. See also Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of 
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 
132 (1976) (holding that States and the NLRB cannot regulate peaceful em-
ployee action not addressed in the NLRA). See generally ROBERT A. GORMAN & 
MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING 1078–110 (2d ed. 2004). The Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012)), similarly preempts a broad ar-
ray of state laws regarding employee benefits issues. See ERISA § 514, 29 
U.S.C. § 1144 (providing that ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws 
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan”); 
Dist. of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992); Mackey 
v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988); Metro. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 
85 (1983); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981). 
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might evaluate labor law changes while, at the same time, ad-
vocating more uniform state employment laws, or even a single 
federal regulatory scheme that would broadly preempt state 
and local laws regarding employment discrimination and har-
assment, wage-hour and overtime practices, and wage-payment 
obligations, in addition to employment-related remedies, among 
other things. Employers, unions, and employees might each 
reap significant benefits from eliminating the current multi-
plicity of state and local employment rights and obligations. 
The result might be greater uniformity and, possibly, a more 
efficient system for resolving employment-related legal dis-
putes.  
Extraordinary challenges—legal, practical, and political—
would complicate any effort to secure a consensus on wide-
ranging legal reforms affecting U.S. labor and employment 
laws generally. Many advocates, for multiple reasons, are likely 
to oppose any curtailment of state and local employment laws, 
which often afford legal protection and remedies not available 
at the federal level.55
Yet, others may argue that, when there is a federal system 
of employment regulation (part of which already purports to 
preempt state and local laws), it undermines any coherent na-
tional labor and employment policy to have fifty-plus regulato-
ry systems concerning employment, particularly in a world 
characterized by intense international and domestic competi-
tion. In this regard, the “fifty-plus” number does not take into 
account the additional existence of multiple forums within most 
states for adjudicating employment-related claims— e.g., one 
for workers’ compensation claims, another for wage-payment 
collection violations, and others for alleged employment dis-
crimination, all in addition to state and local courts. The broad-
er discussion of national labor and employment policy could en-
compass potential gains for all of the constituencies that so 
often have found themselves deadlocked in recent “winner-
takes-all” labor-management debates. 
  
B. REEVALUATE ECONOMIC WEAPONS AS PART OF BROADER 
LABOR LAW REFORM  
Another approach—when evaluating other potential labor 
law reforms—could tackle, head-on, the types of economic con-
 
 55. See Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State 
Laws Facilitating Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355, 361–72 (1990).  
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flict permitted under the NLRA. This would be no easy feat. 
Our current system of protecting strikes, lockouts, boycotts, 
and work stoppages has existed for nearly eighty years. Be-
cause survival has turned on success in inflicting or surviving 
real or threatened economic injury, parties would understand-
ably loathe the prospect of giving up any existing rights, and it 
would be entirely rational to aggressively seek a decrease in the 
weapons and protection available to others. If proposed reforms 
affect either the right to withhold one’s labor56 or the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine57
Yet, current U.S. labor law obviously does not constitute 
the only way that one might resolve labor disputes, protect the 
interests of employers, employees, and unions, and provide in-
centives for parties to reach private agreements. Congress has 
succeeded at least four times in reaching a consensus regarding 
significant changes in U.S. labor law policy.
—both of which have long been recog-
nized as fundamental principles—this would further increase 
the difficulty of accomplishing employment regulatory reforms. 
In fact, for these and other reasons, one might see bipartisan 
opposition to suggested changes in the economic weapons cur-




 56. See, e.g., JOHN R. COMMONS & JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LA-
BOR LEGISLATION 7 (1916).   
 Moreover, at 
This right to withhold property is like the laborer’s right to withhold 
his labor, by refusing to work or by quitting work. But in the case of 
the laborer this is also “liberty”—a “personal” right rather than a 
“property” right. It is his right to withhold his services from the use of 
others until their value can be agreed upon. This is the legal basis of 
his wage bargain. 
Id. But see Harry T. Edwards, Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public 
Sector, 10 DUQ. L. REV. 357, 373 (1972) (“In the private sector, granting of the 
right to strike under the NLRA was not due to recognition of any constitution-
al right, but rather was the result of a public policy decision that the right to 
strike was a valuable step in guaranteeing self-determinism to employees.” 
(citing Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926); United Fed’n of Postal 
Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C.), aff’d, 404 U.S. 802 (1971) 
(mem.))). 
 57. The employment-at-will doctrine has been described as “a basic prem-
ise undergirding American Labor law” which generally recognizes the right of 
employers “to discharge or retain employees at will for good cause or for not 
cause, or even for bad cause,” except as otherwise prohibited by statute or 
common law. Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: 
The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 65 (2000) (quot-
ing Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (1884)). 
 58. As noted previously, the NLRA was adopted in 1935, and was amend-
ed in important respects in 1947, 1959 and 1974. See supra text accompanying 
notes 34–36. 
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some level, real and threatened economic injury undermines 
the interests of employers, employees, and unions alike. Nor is 
it unprecedented in the United States to have laws imposing 
certain constraints on strikes, lockouts, and other types of eco-
nomic weaponry. Many are imposed under current federal law, 
and we have decades of experience regulating public-sector la-
bor-management relations with even more significant limita-
tions on strikes, lockouts, and other types of industrial action.59 
And perhaps not coincidentally, the public sector is where or-
ganized labor since the 1960s has been much more successful in 
attracting and retaining employee members.60 Companies and 
unions have also agreed to no-strike/no-lockout commitments in 
collective bargaining agreements throughout most of our histo-
ry under the NLRA.61
C. OTHER POTENTIAL OPTIONS  
 Thus, contrary to what one might initial-
ly think, it may not be so radical to discuss reforms that modify 
our existing treatment of strikes, lockouts, and work stoppages, 
especially if such reforms are considered in the context of 
broader labor and employment policy changes that advance a 
variety of interests. 
Additional suggestions for reform have entailed even more 
dramatic departures from the current U.S. collective bargain-
ing model, including proposals for European-style works coun-
cils,62
 
 59. See Suzanne C. Lacampagne, The Public Sector Right to Strike in 
Canada and the United States: A Comparative Analysis, 6 B.C. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 509, 525–30 (1983).  
 increased reliance on multinational corporate codes of 
 60. See, e.g., Richard B. Freeman, Contraction and Expansion: The Diver-
gence of Private Sector and Public Sector Unionism in the United States, 2 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 63 (1988); Henry S. Farber, Union Membership in the United 
States: The Divergence Between the Public and Private Sectors (Princeton 
Univ., Working Paper No. 503, 2005), available at http://harris.princeton.edu/ 
pubs/pdfs/503.pdf (comparing the fall of private sector union membership with 
the growth of public sector union membership through the 1970s and 1980s).  
 61. Over the years, the impact, scope and enforcement of privately negoti-
ated no-strike/no-lockout arrangements have been addressed in countless de-
cisions of the Board and the courts, including many Supreme Court decisions. 
See, e.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 
(1970); Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers Of America, 428 U.S. 397 
(1976). Cf. JOHN T. DUNLOP, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION AND CON-
SENSUS BUILDING 159 (1984) (describing no-strike, no-lockout pledges used by 
the Atomic Energy Labor Relations Panel and the President’s Missile Sites 
Labor Commission in 1949 and 1961, respectively). 
 62. See, e.g., Roy J. Adams, Should Works Councils Be Used as Industrial 
Relations Policy?, 108 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 25 (1985). 
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conduct,63 and the unbundling of unions from collective bar-
gaining in favor of “political unions” to redress representational 
inequality among lower-income groups.64
  CONCLUSION   
 Efforts to pursue the-
se types of options would probably involve even more formida-
ble hurdles and tradeoffs, while spawning yet additional con-
troversy, but they might still produce some discussions that 
differ from the zero-sum debates that have become so common 
in recent years.  
Throughout our history under the NLRA, the carrot and 
stick of collective bargaining have been the desire to avoid eco-
nomic injury while dealing with the risk that such injury will 
occur. This arrangement has promoted private agreements 
while preserving economic weapons which balance the compet-
ing interests of labor, management, and employees. Yet, in the 
context of global markets for products, services, and labor, the-
se same elements (which I have described as guns, firms, and 
zeal) profoundly affect public discourse regarding U.S. labor-
management relations.  
America remains a country of great opportunity in a world 
of challenges. When addressing U.S. labor and employment pol-
icy issues, all parties will benefit from recognizing their mutual 
interest in reducing conflict and enhancing their shared com-
petitive positions in a global economy. 
 
 63. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transna-
tional Law: The United Nations’ Norms on the Responsibilities of Transna-
tional Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in Inter-
national Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287 (2006); Lance Compa & 
Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrère, Enforcing International Labor Rights Through 
Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 663 (1995); Sean D. 
Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389 (2005). 
 64. See, e.g., Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union: Politics Without 
Collective Bargaining, 123 YALE L.J. 148 (2013). 
